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Much concern about the negative environmental consequences of agricultural
development in Australia, including salinisation, waterlogging and algal blooms,
has focused on the problems of the Murray^Darling Basin. The aim of this article is
to provide an overview of the environmental problems of the Murray^Darling Basin
from an economic perspective, and a selective survey of the relevant economic
literature, including theoretical analysis, modelling and contributions to the
development of water policy. In attempting to understand the complex problems of
the Murray^Darling Basin, an eclectic approach drawing on externality, sustainabil-
ity and property rights perspectives seems most appropriate.
1. Introduction
The Murray^Darling river system has long played an important role in the
Australian agricultural sector, and an equally important role in Australian
thinking about the agricultural sector. The development of irrigated agri-
culture was a central component of the policies of closer settlement and
national development that were adopted from the nineteenth century to the
late twentieth century. More recently, much of the concern about the nega-
tive environmental consequences of agricultural development has focused on
the problems of the Murray^Darling Basin including salinisation, water-
logging and algal blooms. The aim of this article is to provide an overview
of the environmental problems of the Murray^Darling Basin from an
economic perspective, and a selective survey of the relevant economic
literature.
The article is organised as follows. The second section provides
background information on the Murray^Darling river system, the history of
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Canberra.irrigated agriculture and the main environmental problems of the Murray^
Darling Basin. Next, the evolution of policy is discussed, with particular
emphasis on the replacement of the River Murray Waters Agreement by the
Murray^Darling Basin Agreement and the imposition of a Cap on diversions
of water from the river system for irrigation. The major environmental
problems associated with irrigated agriculture and land clearance are out-
lined. The following section deals with frameworks for the economic analysis
of environmental problems based on the concepts of externality, private
and common property rights, and sustainability. These concepts are applied
to the analysis of the Cap on irrigation diversions and to the design of policy
responses to dryland salinity.
2. Background
2.1 The river system
The Murray^Darling Basin covers just over 1 million square kilometres, or
around 14 per cent of the area of Australia, and spans four states (New
South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and South Australia) as well as the
Australian Capital Territory. A detailed description of the system and its
resources is given by Murray^Darling Basin Commission (2000a).
Compared to other river systems of similar size, the Murray^Darling
Basin is characterised by low average rainfall and very high variability in
rainfall. Because of these characteristics, irrigation can greatly enhance the
value of agricultural output. Although there are no reliable measures of the
aggregate value added for irrigated agriculture in the Murray^Darling Basin,
the Basin accounts for about 70 per cent of the total area of irrigated land
in Australia. Cape (1997) suggests that irrigation accounts for around 25 per
cent of the total gross value of agricultural output in Australia, or around
A$7 billion per year, implying that the share of gross output associated with
the Murray^Darling Basin would be around A$5 billion per year. This is
broadly consistent with the baseline estimate of Hall et al. (1993) that
aggregate gross margins for the southern Murray^Darling Basin total about
A$1 billion per year.
The same characteristics, in combination with the working of the policy
process, have contributed to many of the di¤culties that have arisen in
resource management in the Basin. In particular, the variability of £ows has
encouraged over-allocation of irrigation water, leading to problems of
unreliable supplies, low residual £ows and con£ict between upstream and
downstream water users.
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Although individual farmers have undertaken small-scale irrigation
from the early days of European settlement, the history of irrigated agri-
culture in the Murray^Darling Basin has been dominated by government
or government-sponsored initiatives. The ideas of `closer settlement'
and of `development', which played such an important role in the
Australian policy debate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, found a natural expression in government support for irrigated
agriculture.
Irrigated agriculture was suited to operation on the small scale associated
with schemes for closer settlement. Moreover, irrigation o¡ered the po-
tential for replacing low-intensity pastoral activity with high-intensity
horticultural and grain cropping, thereby assisting the policy objective of
developing Australia's natural resources. Economic considerations were,
initially at least, subordinated to the objectives of development and closer
settlement. An important example of government involvement in the early
development of irrigated agriculture was the support provided by the South
Australian and Victorian governments to the Canadian Cha¡ey brothers
in their development of the Renmark and Mildura irrigation settlements in
1887.
The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme was the most important
single national development project undertaken after World War II.
Although its primary purpose was power generation, the Scheme's con-
tribution to further development of irrigation in the Murray^Darling Basin
was an important part of its political appeal.
The combination of large-scale, predominantly public, irrigation projects
and direct diversions by individual farmers led to steady increases in
diversions of water for irrigation from the Murray^Darling Basin.
The intensity with which water is used in agricultural production varies
greatly depending on the commodity being produced and the irrigation tech-
niques employed. Micro-irrigation techniques applied to high-value crops
yield a very high return per unit of water applied, while £ood irrigation
applied to pastures yields very low returns. The water requirements for
selected commodities, using the most common irrigation techniques for the
commodity in question, are shown in table 1.
One way of interpreting table 1 is to consider the implications of changes
in water prices for pro¢tability. For example, if the price of water increased
by A$40 per Ml, the use of irrigation for pasture would become unpro¢table,
and the gross margin from irrigated rice production would fall by nearly
75 per cent. By contrast, the pro¢tability of fruit and vegetable production
would barely be a¡ected.
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The development of agriculture in the Murray^Darling Basin has been
associated with a range of environmental problems, some of which are
speci¢cally linked to irrigation while others re£ect more general impacts of
agriculture. The problems a¡ecting the Basin as a whole may be divided into
¢ve main categories: land degradation; river water salinity; land salinity;
water quality problems; and loss of biodiversity. However, it must be noted
that all these problems are inter-related.
First, there are general land degradation problems such as soil erosion,
acid soils, native vegetation decline, and the impact of weeds and noxious
plants. Because these problems are not speci¢c to irrigated agriculture, or to
the Murray^Darling Basin, they will not be discussed in detail here. How-
ever, these problems must be taken into account in formulating a response to
environmental problems more directly related to irrigation.
Second, there are problems associated with salinity of river water. Irrigation
tends to increase salinity because runo¡ increases salt loads and because the
use of water for irrigation reduces total £ows. Saline water can reduce the yield
of irrigated crops and damage water pipes and domestic appliances.
Reductions in yields of sensitive crops, such as stonefruits, are observed at
salinity levels in excess of 200 EC and for citrus fruits at 300 EC.
1 The quality
of water for human consumption deteriorates perceptibly when salinity exceeds
300 EC, and water with salinity greater than 800 EC is considered unacceptable
for human consumption. The Salinity Audit undertaken by the Murray^
Darling Basin Ministerial Council, concluded that, under current policies:
The average salinity of the lower River Murray (monitored at Morgan) will
exceed the 800 EC threshold for desirable drinking water quality in the next
Table 1 Water required for A$1000 gross profit







Source: Hall et al. (1993)
1The EC unit is a measure of electrical conductivity, commonly used to indicate the
salinity of water. 1 EC  1 micro-Siemen per centimetre, measured at 258C.
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50 per cent. (Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council 2000, p. vi)
Third, there are problems of land salinity, arising primarily from rising water
tables. Dryland salinisation is primarily associated with the clearance of
deep-rooted native trees and their replacement with shallow-rooted crops
and pasture. In addition, weir pools may create a freshwater `dam' that
precludes the drainage of salty water into the river system. The e¡ect is to
raise the water table in the catchment in which clearance takes place, and
therefore to bring saline water closer to the surface. As the groundwaters
rise, naturally occurring salts (principally sodium chloride) are dissolved and
brought towards the surface, where the water evaporates leaving high con-
centrations of salt. In addition to the e¡ects of salinity on crops, vegetation
and wetlands, rising water tables cause waterlogging of land and damage to
roads and buildings. However, this process is not uniform. The e¡ect of tree
clearance on water tables is greatest when trees are cleared on recharge areas,
but the resulting salinisation takes place primarily in discharge areas. The
issue is complicated by more general concerns relating tree clearance to loss
of biodiversity and to an increase in net emissions of greenhouse gases.
Fourth, there are water quality problems other than salinity, including
turbidity, and eutrophication resulting from excess nutrients such as fertiliser
runo¡. Eutrophication is associated with algal blooms such the blue-green
algae bloom which occurred in the Darling River in 1991^92, and which was
described as `the largest river bloom of blue-green algae recorded anywhere
in the world' (Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council 1994, p. 3). These
problems have been exacerbated by the e¡ects of introduced species such as
European carp.
Finally, there are problems of biodiversity and loss of habitat, particularly
those arising from changes in the patterns of river £ows, and the reduction in
the volume of water £owing into wetlands such as the Macquarie Marshes. In
the last few years, there have also been proposals to restore £ows to the Snowy
River, 99 per cent of which is currently diverted to the Murray^Darling Basin
through the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme.
3. Policy
Following the terminology of Randall (1981), the evolution of policy
regarding the Murray^Darling Basin may be divided into two phases: an
expansionary phase, which coincided with the operation of the River Murray
Waters Agreement; and a mature phase, re£ected in the adoption of the
Murray^Darling Basin Agreement. The crucial event thus far in the mature
phase has been the imposition of `the Cap', a limit on aggregate diversions of
water from the Murray^Darling Basin.
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Regulation of the Murray River system was one of the ¢rst issues addressed
after Federation. A period of drought beginning in 1895 culminated in the
`Federation drought' of 1901^2. One result was a non-government con-
ference held in Corowa in 1902, which called for government action to
manage the waters of the Murray River (Murray^Darling Basin Commission
2000b).
A prolonged period of negotiation followed, during which the states
claimed property rights over the waters of the Murray and its tributaries.
South Australia relied on the provisions of the newly-enacted Constitution
under which the Commonwealth government had authority over navigation
along the Murray River and an implied obligation to preserve £ows in the
South Australian section of the river. Although the navigation rationale soon
lost its relevance, South Australia's claim of rights to some minimum £ow
was consistent with doctrines of prior appropriation. The upstream states,
Victoria and New South Wales, favoured the riparian doctrine, under which
landowners are free to take water from streams £owing through their
property. As the `Premier State', New South Wales claimed riparian rights
not only over its own rivers, but over the entire main stream of the Murray.
Although the border between New South Wales and Victoria was determined
to follow the southern bank of the river, Victoria successfully claimed equal
rights over the river £ow.
Negotiations were ¢nally concluded in 1915. The River Murray Waters
Agreement, to which the Commonwealth and the states of New South
Wales, Victoria and South Australia were parties, set out the basic
conditions which still remain in force today:
. £ow at Albury is shared equally between New South Wales and
Victoria;
. Victoria and New South Wales retain control of their tributaries below
Albury;
. Victoria and New South Wales supply South Australia with a guaranteed
minimum quantity of water.
The agreement also provided for construction of dams, weirs and locks
on the main stream of the Murray to be managed by the River Murray
Commission (predecessor of the current Murray^Darling Basin Commission)
which was established in 1917 (Murray^Darling Basin Commission 2000b).
The River Murray Commission owned and operated the structures, but this
function has now been divested to a separate organisation, River Murray
Water, in line with current thinking about the desirability of separating
regulatory and operational functions.
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River Murray Waters Agreement was limited to the management of water
for irrigation and navigation. As Clark (1982) notes, most environmental
issues were matters beyond the powers of the River Murray Commission
and were left to individual states to resolve.
3.2 The Murray^Darling Basin Agreement
Recent developments in policy regarding the Murray^Darling Basin re£ect
the constraints associated with a maturing water economy (Watson and Rose
1980; Randall 1981). Randall argues that where the exploitation of irrigation
opportunities is in its early stages, we observe an expansionary water
economy, characterised by relatively low social cost of expanded water use, in
total and at the margin. In such circumstances, the welfare cost of subsidies
to water use is small. When the expansionary phase reaches its inevitable end,
and a mature water economy emerges, the problem of managing the resource
is complicated by the persistence of policies inherited from the expansionary
phase. Randall's (1981) characterisation of the main features of expansionary
and mature water economies is presented in table 2.
Table 2 Characteristics of expansionary and mature water economies
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Social cost of subsidising
increased water use
Fairly low High and rising
Source: Randall (1981, table 1)
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characteristics of an expansionary water economy. As shown in ¢gure 1, the
supply of irrigation water responded rapidly to growing demand. The
physical infrastructure associated with the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric
Scheme and the associated downstream irrigation systems were fairly new,
and governments were willing to support these investments even when rates
of return were low or negative. Environmental problems and competition for
water use became evident during the 1970s. By the late 1980s, these problems
were pressing and the transition to a mature water economy was largely
complete. The aging of physical infrastructure coincided with an increase in
real interest rates and increasing pressure to reduce public debt, making
governments unwilling to ¢nance new capital investments.
As diversions for irrigation approached or exceeded the capacity of the
Murray^Darling River system, and environmental problems became more
serious, the need for a coordinated approach to management of the Basin as a
whole became more evident. The Murray^Darling Basin Agreement was
signed in 1987. In its initial form, it was as an amendment to the River Murray
Waters Agreement. Five years later, in 1992, a totally new Murray^Darling
Basin Agreement was signed, replacing the River Murray Waters Agreement.
Figure 1 Annual diversions from the Murray^Darling Basin 1920^95 with projections to
2020
Source: Murray^Darling Basin Commission (2000)
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1993 which was passed by all the contracting governments. Queensland also
became a signatory, under terms set out in a Schedule to the Agreement. In
1998, the Australian Capital Territory formalised its participation in the
Agreement through a Memorandum of Understanding.
The stated purpose of the Murray^Darling Basin Agreement is `to
promote and coordinate e¡ective planning and management for the equit-
able, e¤cient and sustainable use of the water, land and other environmental
resources of the Murray^Darling Basin' (Murray^Darling Basin Agreement
1992, Clause 1, cited by Murray^Darling Basin Commission 2000b).
To achieve this, the Agreement established new institutions at the political,
bureaucratic and community levels. These are:
. the Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC);
. the Murray^Darling Basin Commission (MDBC); and
. the Community Advisory Committee (CAC).
The principal business of the institutions established under the Agreement
has been to formulate a response to the unsustainable growth in diversions
of water from the Basin for irrigation and other purposes.
3.3 The Cap
Shortly after its formation, the Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council
responded to the problem of excess demand for water. In 1995, the Council
introduced a moratorium on the future growth in diversions of water from
the Basin, which was replaced, from 1 July 1997, by a permanent upper limit
to diversions, known as the Cap.
The Cap is de¢ned as the volume of water that would have been diverted
under 1993^94 levels of development. The Cap is not the volume of water that
was used in 1993^94. Rather, the Cap in any year is the volume of water that
would have been used with the infrastructure (pumps, dams, channels, areas
developed for irrigation, management rules and so on) that existed in 1993^
94, assuming similar climatic and hydrologic conditions to those experienced
in the year in question. Thus, the Cap provides scope for greater water use in
certain years and lower use in other years (Independent Audit Group 1996).
Under the agreement to implement the Cap, each state is required to
implement a management plan for each of the catchments under its control.
3.4 The Council of Australian Governments
The development of policy with respect to the Murray^Darling Basin has been
signi¢cantly a¡ected by agreements reached by the Council of Australian
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February 1994, COAG endorsed an agreement for the sustainable reform of
the water industry. COAG's Water Resource Policy called for clearer
speci¢cation of users' rights and access to water, and the provision of water
for the environment. The key objective was to encourage water use which
would achieve its highest value among both consumptive and non-
consumptive uses, while ensuring that the use is ecologically sustainable
(COAG 1994). In April 1995, the Water Resource Policy became a component
of the National Competition Agreement.
The general e¡ect of the COAG agreements is to reinforce the policy
preference for price-based and market-based solutions to environmental
problems. However, the Competition Principles Agreement also requires that
a number of matters shall, where relevant, be taken into account. The
¢rst of these is `government legislation and policies relating to ecologically
sustainable development'. The Australian Conservation Foundation has
supported the application of National Competition Policy to water, stressing
the requirement for sustainability. However, it is opposed to the creation of
water rights with unlimited tenure (Australian Conservation Foundation
1994), which is arguably implicit in the program set out in the 1994 and 1995
COAG agreements. This con£ict re£ects the tension between private and
common property rights.
4. Analytical frameworks
A wide range of analytical frameworks have been used by environmental
economists to analyse environmental problems and to propose policy
responses. It is useful to distinguish three main frameworks, based on the
concepts of externality, sustainability and property rights, respectively.
The concept of externality is due to Pigou (1924). Coase (1960) challenged
the Pigovian approach and argued instead for an analysis based on the
concept of property rights. The origins of the concept of sustainability are
less clear, and the range of approaches encompassed by the term `sustain-
ability' is much broader. The concept may be traced back to the idea of
`maximum sustainable yield' prominent in biological approaches to natural
resource management, but uses of the term in economics have diverged
considerably from this starting point.
Many debates between the advocates of these di¡erent approaches remain
unresolved. An assessment of their strengths and weakness must therefore
re£ect personal judgements rather than professional consensus. In this
article, it will be argued that, for the analysis of complex problems such as
those of irrigated agriculture, it is appropriate to take an eclectic approach,
using di¡erent analytical frameworks in di¡erent contexts.
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Pigou (1924) sought, for the ¢rst time, to present a rigorous analysis of
optimal government intervention based on neoclassical welfare economics.
An action by a ¢rm or individual is de¢ned as having external e¡ects if it
directly a¡ects either the productive capacity of other ¢rms or the welfare of
other individuals. The key idea is that the actions of one individual directly
impinge on others, without any direct market interaction. Pigou proposed
that taxes or subsidies could be used to internalise externalities, by equating
the marginal private cost of externality-generating activities with the
marginal social cost.
Many di¡erent concepts of externality have been analysed. A useful dis-
tinction is that between point-source externalities, di¡use or nonpoint
externalities and congestion externalities. A point-source externality problem
arises when a single ¢rm generates externalities a¡ecting one or more other
¢rms or individuals. In the analysis of the problems of the Murray^Darling
Basin, point-source externalities are less important than di¡use or nonpoint
externalities, which arise when many ¢rms or individuals contribute to an
external e¡ect on one or more others.
A second crucial distinction is that between unilateral and reciprocal or
congestion externalities. Unilateral externalities arise when the actions of one
party generate externalities a¡ecting another, but not vice versa. To the
extent that the actions of upstream users degrade water quality for down-
stream users, the salinity problem may be viewed as a unilateral nonpoint
externality.
Congestion externalities arise when members of a group generate negative
externalities a¡ecting each other. Congestion externalities frequently arise
in irrigation areas. Application of irrigation water results in rising water
tables, with consequent waterlogging and salinisation. However, because of
the complex hydrology of water catchments, such problems rarely display
the complete symmetry of textbook congestion problems. Activities such as
tree clearance have most e¡ect on water tables when they take place in
recharge areas, but the consequences are most evident in discharge areas.
Thus, to some extent, there is a unilateral externality that is generated by
land users in recharge areas and a¡ects land users in discharge areas (who
may or may not be the same people).
The analysis of congestion externalities raises theoretical di¤culties not
readily resolved within the externality framework. Imposition of a Pigovian
tax in the presence of congestion may make all resource users worse o¡,
unless the tax revenue is returned to users. This problem is likely to result in
political resistance to congestion taxes, and may also distort incentives for
locally funded investments that enhance the value of the resource. But unless
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return of tax revenue may weaken or negate the incentive e¡ects of the
Pigovian tax.
The externality framework is most valuable in the consideration of
unilateral externalities. Many policy problems involving unilateral external-
ities develop as variations on a common pattern. An activity is initially
undertaken without recognition of any negative external e¡ects. Over time,
either because of an expansion in the scale of the activity, accumulation of
stocks of polluting by-products, or because of improvements in scienti¢c
knowledge, negative external e¡ects are recognised. The policy problem now
generates a con£ict between e¤ciency objectives, which can be achieved
through taxation or regulation of the externality-generating activity, and
equity concerns arising from the fact that investments in the activity have
been made without any expectation of such taxation or regulation.
4.2 Property rights
The property rights approach was advanced by Coase (1960) as part of a
critique of Pigou's externality approach, with its reliance on government
intervention. Coase discussed unilateral externalities involving two parties,
and propounded the famous `Coase theorem' that, in the absence of trans-
actions costs, assignment of property rights to either party would result in
negotiations leading to a Pareto-optimal outcome.
In practice, however, unilateral externality problems are frequently char-
acterised by signi¢cant transactions costs, such as those arising from
strategic behaviour. The property rights approach has proved more useful in
dealing with complex interactions between multiple users of a resource.
Analysis of property rights in environmental problems initially focused
on private property rights (Coase 1960; Scott 1955). Scott showed that
private ownership of a ¢shery would yield a socially optimal outcome
whereas open access (which Scott misleadingly referred to as common
property) would not. These ideas were developed by the `property rights
school' including Demsetz (1967) and Furubotn and Pejovich (1974).
However, as Randall (1983) observed, the private property rights school
found great di¤culty in analysing changes in property rights. This is critical,
since, within this framework, it is only through changes in property rights
structures that environmental issues can be addressed. Randall (1983) dis-
tinguishes between two post-Coasian traditions: a Coase^Posner tradition,
following Posner (1972), which advocates £exibility in property rights when
this would promote e¤ciency, and a Coase^Buchanan tradition which
emphasises security and stability of rights. Randall points out the weaknesses
of the Coase^Posner tradition. In addition to the reduction in the value of
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that instability in property rights encourages `rent-seeking' behaviour aimed
at securing a reassignment of rights. The Coase^Buchanan tradition is based
on a contractarian theory of rights, of the type speci¢ed by Buchanan
(1977). Following a hypothetical initial assignment of rights, all subsequent
changes would be through voluntary exchange or other consensual processes.
This approach meets Randall's objections to the Coase^Posner tradition,
but involves signi¢cant limitations of its own.
The private property rights framework provides some useful descriptive
insights into environmental problems of this kind, but very little policy
guidance. The Coase^Buchanan view, that property rights should be inviolate,
is equitable only if the initial distribution of rights was equitable. Since the
initial allocation of rights over the Murray^Darling Basin gave almost nothing
to the environment, environmentalists have sought to change this allocation.
The Coase^Posner view that property rights will evolve to take account of
changing values is based on the assumption that there exists an activist
judiciary, willing to make the necessary changes through its interpretation of
common and statute law. In the Australian context, this is not a realistic
assumption, and the Coase^Posner view gives little guidance to legislators or
bureaucrats regarding the way in which property rights should be changed.
One response to the di¤culties associated with the private property rights
analysis has been an increasing interest in the concept of common property.
Economists in the private property rights tradition had long used the term
`common property' as a synonym for `no property'. As long as this terminology
was con¢ned to the study of open access resources, as in the work of Scott
(1955), it was merely confusing. However, when economists in this tradition,
such as Demsetz (1967), were confronted with actual common property
institutions, they readily assumed that their open access model was applicable.
The erroneous equation of common property with open access was
popularised by Hardin's (1968) `tragedy of the commons' description of the
medieval open ¢eld system and the accompanying argument for private
property rights solutions to modern environmental problems. The work of
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and Dahlman (1980) refuted Hardin's
description of the open ¢eld system. This was followed by work describing the
actual operations of contemporary common property systems in less developed
countries, such as that of Jodha (1986) and Wade (1987). The concept of
common property has proved useful in the analysis of traditional irrigation
systems (Mahendrarajah 1986). In the Sri Lankan system examined by
Mahendrarajah, land is privately owned and operated, but irrigation works are
common property, and access to water during periods of drought is collectively
managed. Common property ideas have also been applied to more general
environmental issues such as the management of airsheds and river systems.
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systems of common property are very rare. Systems of agricultural property
rights typically involve a mixture of private and common property similar
to that observed by Mahendrarajah (1986). In the medieval open ¢eld
system, for example, privately owned cattle were grazed on common
pastures, which reverted to private ownership in the cropping phase of the
rotation cycle.
The notion of common property has played an important role in modelling
of the Murray^Darling system by Quiggin (1988a), Hall et al. (1993) and
Sappideen et al. (1998). These models share a common basic structure. The
Murray River system is divided into a number of subregions, which are
organised in a sequential fashion, from upstream to downstream. Hall et al.
extend this idea by modelling the whole Murray^Darling system as a
directed network, with the upstream^downstream relationship as a partial
ordering. Within each region, the allocation of resources may be represented
as a linear programming problem, with a range of activities varying in the
gross margins they yield and the intensity of water use required. Yields are
a¡ected by salinity, usually through a simple linear relationship based on the
work of Maas and Ho¡man (1977). In some cases, urban water use in
Adelaide is also modelled.
The link between regions arises from the fact that water use upstream
a¡ects the availability and quality of water downstream. Quiggin (1988a)
compared the solution arising when the linear programming problems in
each region were solved sequentially to maximise surplus in each region, with
the dynamic programming solution which maximises surplus for the river
system as a whole. Quiggin characterises the ¢rst solution as an `open access'
solution and the second solution as a `common property' solution.
The di¡erence between the common property solution and the open access
solution represents the social loss associated with the upstream^downstream
externality. This loss includes not only damage caused by salinity but pro-
duction opportunities foregone because of salinity and reduced water avail-
ability. Various methods of internalising this externality have been considered.
Quiggin (1988a) considers the e¡ect of higher water prices, incorporating an
implicit Pigovian tax. Hall et al. (1993) examine the impact of making water
rights tradable. Both approaches yield signi¢cant welfare improvements.
The model analysed by Quiggin (1988a) is very simple, consisting of six
regions and four crops, and is characterised as `illustrative' rather than as a
detailed representation. Subsequent work has extended this simple model in
various ways. Hall et al.'s (1993) model has more regions and crops and
includes market supply and demand. Sappideen (pers. comm.) has developed
a dynamic model with monthly steps in place of the once-o¡ annual model
of Quiggin (1988a). Quiggin (2000) extends the technology to allow for
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based on the approach developed by Chambers and Quiggin (2000).
4.3 Sustainability
Much public discussion of environmental issues focuses on the notion of
sustainability. So many di¡erent de¢nitions of sustainability have been
o¡ered that discussion of the issue is inevitably confused. However, much of
the intuition behind the term comes from simple models of sustainable yield,
derived from biological and economic analysis of ¢sheries and forestry.
Analysis based on this intuition has proceeded in two quite di¡erent
directions. The ¢rst approach is to treat sustainability as a property of
growth paths for the economy as a whole. The resulting analysis may be
contrasted with `old growth theory' (Solow 1956) in which natural resources
did not play an important role.
Theoretical analysis of sustainability and growth begins with the
proposition that the interests of future generations should be given equal
weight with our own in making decisions a¡ecting the long-term future. This
proposition was taken as axiomatic by Ramsey (1928) in deriving his savings
rule, but was dropped in most of the literature on `old growth theory'. Since
this literature focused almost exclusively on the case of rising living
standards, the fact that future bene¢ts are discounted merely implies a slower
rate of improvement. However, if the prospect that environmental degrada-
tion could lead to lower living standards in future is taken seriously, the idea
that the welfare of future generations should be discounted appears in-
equitable, since it implies support for redistribution from low-income future
generations to the higher-income present generation.
In the absence of inherent discounting of utility, the discount rate (at any
point an optimal growth path) is endogenously determined by the rate of
technological progress and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(Howarth 1991; Howarth and Norgaard 1990). The discount rate is that
given by the Ramsey `golden rule':
Z _ Ct  YK=Kt;
where:
Ct is consumption at time t;
Yt is output;
Kt is the capital stock.
Z  ÿU
00 CtCt=U
0 Ct is a measure of aversion to intertemporal variations
in consumption. Thus, provided the rate of technological progress is positive,
the discount rate will also be positive.
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that capital, that is, technology embodied in produced goods, cannot be
substituted inde¢nitely for natural resources, taken broadly to include all the
contributions of the natural environment to human welfare, and agricultural
production in particular (Hartwick 1977). In the absence of substitution
opportunities, it may be appropriate to apply one discount rate to environ-
mental goods and another to produced goods. In particular, if deteriorating
stocks of natural resources coexist with general technological progress, the
optimal discount rate for natural resources may be negative or zero even
though the general discount rate is positive.
Similar results may, however, be obtained without the need for separate
discount rates by projecting steadily rising relative prices for environmental
goods. Dasgupta and MÌler (1990) argue that all the concerns addressed by
sustainability theorists can be addressed more appropriately in the analysis
of the present value Hamiltonian arising from the solution to an optimal
growth problem.
Attempts to derive general principles from sustainability theory lead
naturally to the conclusion that unsustainable practices arise as the result of
an inappropriate choice of marginal discount rates (Quiggin 1997). Intensive
agricultural industries based on irrigation have encountered sustainability
problems relating to salinity, siltation and waterlogging. In these cases, the
general approach to sustainability based on reducing the rate of discount of
future environmental bene¢ts appears appropriate.
The second direction of development of the concept of sustainability has
been a search for speci¢c sustainability rules analogous to the sustainable
catch rule for ¢sheries. Within this framework, speci¢c practices may be
classed as `sustainable' or `unsustainable', according to whether they satisfy
the sustainability rule. A variety of sustainability rules are discussed by
Barbier (1987) and Barbier et al. (1990). The sustainability rule approach
works best in the case of activities, like ¢sheries, that are dependent on a
speci¢c local stock of natural capital.
In the case of irrigated agriculture, the most important stock of natural
capital is the river system and the associated watersheds. Degradation of the
stock of natural capital is re£ected in rising water tables, reduced river £ows
and higher levels of salinity. Hence, a sustainable set of practices is one that
ensures that the river system will be stabilised at an acceptable level of
salinity, water quality and water £ow.
5. Policy responses to environmental problems
Before the 1980s, most policy responses to the environmental problems of
the Murray^Darling Basin involved local measures designed to mitigate
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approach has gradually been subordinated to Basin-wide concerns about the
sustainability and economic e¤ciency of practices regarding water use
and land clearance in Australian agriculture, concerns which have focused
particularly on the problems of the Murray^Darling Basin. These concerns
have been re£ected in the development of policies limiting tree clearance and
the diversion of water for irrigation.
An analysis of recent developments in environmental management must
be informed both by the theoretical frameworks described above and by
consideration of the institutions of the Australian federal system. The
starting point of the policy process has been the determination of desired
limits on tree clearance and water diversion based on sustainability criteria.
The attempt to satisfy these criteria has been based on a combination of
direct regulation, pricing policies justi¢ed primarily in terms of Pigovian
welfare theory, and attempts to create markets for appropriately de¢ned
property rights. These policies may usefully be analysed in terms of the
interaction between private and common property rights and of the
determination of prices that take appropriate account of externalities.
5.1 Tree clearance and dryland salinity
The problem of dryland salinity raises problems of non-reciprocal externality.
Farmers clearing trees from recharge areas may impose externalities on others
whose land consists largely of discharge areas. In principle, these issues could
be addressed through Pigovian taxes, as proposed by Greig and Devonshire
(1981). In practice, however, no policy proposals of this kind have been
considered. Hence, as is commonly the case, externality concepts are of more
value in understanding the problem than in designing policy responses.
The sustainability framework is also helpful in understanding the problem.
Fisher (1995) discusses the di¤culties of farmers facing the ¢nancial pres-
sures of low commodity prices, for whom there appears to be little alter-
native to farming practices that will, in the long run, increase salinity and
reduce the value of their own property, as well as that of neighbouring
farmers. Farmers in ¢nancial di¤culty face high e¡ective discount rates, and
are therefore more likely to adopt unsustainable farming practices (Blyth
and Kirby 1984; Quiggin 1987).
Responses to the perceived unsustainability of land management practices
and particularly tree clearance have taken two main forms. First, most states
have imposed restrictions on tree clearance. Second, there have been attempts
to promote sustainable practices through cooperative programs such as
Landcare.
Restrictions on tree clearance represent an attenuation of the rights of
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Compensation has been paid in some, but not all, cases. Proposals for
restrictions on tree clearance in Queensland, motivated primarily by concerns
about biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions, are currently (August
2000) the subject of debate between the Commonwealth and State govern-
ments regarding compensation. In anticipation of such restrictions, the rate
of tree clearance has increased.
Hodge (1982) analysed the case for the creation of private property rights
to cleared land, and an associated market in which such rights could be
traded. The basic argument is familiar. Assuming that the socially optimal
area of cleared land has been determined, the market in rights to cleared land
will ensure that such rights are allocated to those who value them most
highly, thereby achieving any given reduction in land clearance at minimum
social cost. Quiggin (1986) extended this analysis, arguing that, in the
presence of uncertainty about optimal cleared areas, common property
institutions for catchment management would be required in addition to
private rights to cleared land.
5.2 Sustainability and the Cap
The decision of the Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council in 1995 to
impose a Cap on water usage in the Basin was the crucial event in the move
from an expansionary water economy to a mature water economy. The
imposition of the Cap was a response to evidence that the existing policy
framework was unsustainable.
In one sense, the unsustainability of existing policies is self-evident. As
shown in ¢gure 1, if entitlements existing in 1995 were fully developed by
2020, as was predicted in the absence of policy change, more than 90 per cent
of the average natural £ow to the sea would be diverted annually.
A more di¤cult problem is to assess the extent to which diversion levels
and irrigation practices are unsustainable, in the sense that, at the margin,
the costs of the long-term damage they generate outweigh the bene¢ts of
additional agricultural output. Until quite recently, there was no clear
evidence that overall salinity levels in the rivers of the Murray^Darling Basin
had increased over time; rather, they seemed to have remained `relatively
constant' (Meacham 1984). However, this is no longer the case, with studies
now showing that salinity levels are rising signi¢cantly in most rivers in the
Basin (Williamson et al. 1997), except where remedial actions have been
undertaken.
The Murray^Darling Basin Ministerial Council (2000) estimates the costs
associated with salinity at A$46 million per year. This amount is relatively
modest compared to aggregate gross margins of the order of A$1 billion per
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salinity and higher costs. Moreover, Quiggin (1988b) argues that estimates
of costs actually incurred fail to capture the full reduction in welfare
associated with externalities.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that, in the absence of cost-
re£ective prices and smoothly functioning markets for water rights, water is
not, in general, allocated to the use that will generate the highest bene¢t.
Hence, there is no unique and well-de¢ned measure of the marginal bene¢ts
of additional agricultural output. It follows that an appropriate analysis of
sustainability must take account of property rights and externality
considerations.
5.3 Private property rights
The private property rights approach yields a range of useful insights into
the problems of the Murray^Darling system. Brennan and Scoccimarro
(1999) apply the private property rights approach in considering the
development of water markets.
During the expansionary phase of the water economy in the Murray^
Darling system, individual irrigators obtained a variety of private rights to
use water. Rights were typically unlimited in duration, either explicitly or
because they were based on licences that were renewed automatically.
However, rights were attenuated in various ways. First, they were not, in
general, tradable, except through the sale of the land to which they were
attached. Second, they were contingent on the availability of adequate water.
Third, the value of existing rights was limited by the relative ease with which
developers of new irrigation areas could obtain water allocations. Hence,
the property rights regime had some of the characteristics of an open access
resource.
There were some moves towards tradeability of rights during the 1980s
and early 1990s (Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999), but the crucial policy
decision was the imposition of the Cap.
2 In part, this decision involved
restrictions on the use of water rights, thereby attenuating the private
property rights of individual users. However, the imposition of the Cap
implied that, in future, no net creation of new private water rights would be
permitted. The e¡ect, therefore, was to raise the value of existing rights, to
the extent that such rights were preserved after the imposition of the Cap.
Moreover, the imposition of the Cap was accompanied by an increase in the
2South Australia had already restricted the issue of new licences, but the crucial problems
of over-allocation were in the upstream states a¡ected by the Cap. A partial moratorium
on new licences in New South Wales proved ine¡ective because of existing over-allocation.
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have not been fully detached from land, and trading of water rights remains
limited, trade is likely to grow in future.
Since existing rights exceeded appropriations, and the Cap precluded any
increase in appropriations (and foreshadowed the possibility of reductions in
total appropriations), the imposition of the Cap implied some net withdrawal
of rights. The approach recommended by the Independent Audit Group
(1996), and adopted by the states in their implementation of the Cap, was to
create a hierarchy of rights.
The hierarchy proposed by the Independent Audit Group is a lexico-
graphic ordering in which rights are ordered by their legal status, then by
history of use, with rights of a given legal status being ranked higher if there
is a history of use. The legal categories are subdivided on the basis of the
existence or absence of a history of use, leading to a system of six categories:
1. statutory rights with a history of use;
2. `sleeper' statutory rights with no history of use;
3. non-statutory rights with a history of use;
4. non-statutory rights with no history of use;
5. formal promises of future access; and
6. expectations of access based on past practices.
`Sleeper' rights (rights allocated to particular blocks of land, but never used)
fall into category 2, while the used and unused components of `dozer' rights
(partially unused rights) are allocated to categories 1 and 2 respectively.
All rights with a history of usage as of 1993^94 fall into categories 1 and
3. It follows, given the existence of `sleeper' and `dozer' rights, and some
rights created after 1993^94, that the total rights allocated under categories
1, 2 and 3 must equal or exceed the Cap. Hence, the total allocation of rights
in categories 1, 2 and 3 must be reduced before any rights in categories 4, 5
and 6 can be converted into access.
There are a variety of ways in which the requirements of the Cap could
be met. First, technological improvements could reduce losses of water
through evaporation and absorption in channels, thereby permitting a
smaller aggregate diversion of water to satisfy a given set of rights to water
use. Second, some existing rights could be purchased from their holders.
Third, rights with a limited duration could be withdrawn or downgraded at
the expiration of their term, rather than being automatically renewed in line
with past practice. Finally, an `e¤ciency dividend' could be imposed on
holders of rights. This would take the form of a proportional reduction in
allocations based on an assessment of the average reduction in water
consumption that would be associated with the adoption of `best practice'
technology in on-farm water use.
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`sleeper' and `dozer' statutory rights rank ahead of less formal rights with a
history of use, even though irrigators may have come to rely on the latter
rights. The alternative of giving a lower ranking to inactive rights has
obvious political advantages, since those from whom rights are withdrawn
do not su¡er any actual loss of income, though they lose potential future
bene¢ts. Assuming that rights are not perfectly tradable, there are also
e¤ciency advantages. In general, the fact that rights are not being used
indicates that the use for which they are allocated is of low value. Hence, the
social cost of withdrawing these rights is low.
However, the uncompensated withdrawal of statutory rights is a violation
of the general norm that property rights should be secure, and may be seen
as reducing the value of property rights in general. An additional di¤culty
with placing a high weight on a history of usage is that, if anticipated, this
approach creates `use it or lose it' incentives, leading holders of rights to
exercise them even when the costs of doing so exceed the bene¢ts.
A closely related set of issues arises from proposals to restore some
proportion of the £ows previously diverted from the Snowy River.
Restoration of £ows to the Snowy River implies a reduction of £ows to the
Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers and hence either a reduction in diversions
or a reduction in the residual £ow in those rivers. A reduction in diversions
must be achieved by one of the methods considered above.
The di¤culties associated with the interaction between private rights to
water use and common rights over catchments and the Basin as a whole are
most acute in New South Wales. Water use in Queensland has been growing
rapidly, but from a low base. South Australia has historically adopted a
conservative allocation policy, with the result that existing statutory rights
can be accommodated within the Cap. In Victoria there has been modest
over-allocation, in the sense that, under existing patterns of water use, not all
rights could be exercised in years of very low £ow.
In New South Wales, by contrast, over-allocation has been routine. As a
result, even category 1 rights cannot be fully exercised in low-£ow years.
Moreover, the ratio of `sleeper' and `dozer' rights to active statutory rights is
high. Further, there are increasing diversions of water by riparian users on
unregulated tributaries (those not controlled by dams and weirs) and
increasing capture of surface water through farm dams.
Given this background, a move to tradability of New South Wales water
rights without some withdrawal of existing rights would lead to allocations
far in excess of the Cap, and, in many cases, in excess of the maximum
physical capacity of catchments. These issues are discussed further in NSW
Department of Land and Water Conservation (1998). Further issues
regarding tradability are discussed by Crase et al. (2000).
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Management Bill 2000 introduced in June 2000. The Bill incorporates
explicit recognition of environmental externalities for the ¢rst time, and is
based on sustainability considerations, particularly the principle that £ows
needed to restore adequate river health should have a prior right over the
provision of water for consumptive use.
However, the main focus is on de¢ning private property rights in a way
that is consistent with total availability of water and e¤cient resource use.
Except for a limited domestic use and stock allowance, riparian rights over
unregulated rivers are replaced by a system of three categories of water
entitlements available under conditions of low, medium and high £ow. In
general, water rights over regulated rivers are converted from volumetric
entitlements to shares in the available £ow. However, in periods of severe
water shortage, high security users, including urban water supplies, power
companies and some growers of permanent crops such as vines and fruit
trees will have priority over irrigators with general security (NSW
Department of Land and Water Conservation 1999).
5.4 The role of common property
The e¡ect of combining regional management of aggregate water use in each
catchment with the expansion of trading rights is to create a mixture of
private and common property rights. Such an approach is an optimal re-
sponse to the problems of shared resources, such as catchments, where
knowledge is imperfect.
In much of the property rights literature, the creation of a perfectly well-
de¢ned set of private property rights is assumed to be the ideal policy
outcome. In the case of an irrigation system like that operating in the
Murray^Darling Basin, a water property right might be speci¢ed as a
contingent annual allocation depending on a detailed speci¢cation of the
relevant states of the natural system, including initial levels of water storage,
rainfall, temperature and stochastic occurrences like algal outbreaks. Given
such a detailed speci¢cation of the possible events, there would be no need
for further intervention once the rights had been created and the market
established. Equally, however, given such detailed knowledge and a speci-
¢cation of the demand function, it would be possible for a central manager
to determine the optimal allocations of water directly.
In the real world of imperfect knowledge, the dilemma observed by
Randall (1983) is inescapable. A system of property rights must be £exible
enough to permit adjustment in the light of new knowledge, but this
means that individual rights cannot be perfectly speci¢ed. Quiggin (1988b)
argues that the appropriate response to this problem is the creation of
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private property rights of individual resource users may be constrained
and modi¢ed.
Dudley (1992) proposes an alternative response to the common property
problem, based on the idea of capacity sharing. Rather than annual
entitlements to water, individuals would receive rights to a certain pro-
portion of the capacity in a given storage. At their discretion, they could call
for a release of capacity and a corresponding delivery of water. The storage
could be managed collectively by the owners or by a private or public
corporation.
Recognition of the common property aspects of the Murray^Darling
Basin is most evident in the Integrated Catchment Management Framework
(Murray^Darling Basin Commission 2000c):
[This will] will identify targets that are needed for the Basin, such as water
quality and river health. These targets will help ensure that key assets
in each catchment and in the whole Basin, such as wetlands, native
vegetation, built infrastructure, recreational areas, cultural sites, high
quality drinking water and productive land, are protected. This will mean,
for example, setting targets for the levels of salinity in the water £owing
out the end of major valleys. Local communities, industries and govern-
ments, working together, will need to decide what assets in each catchment
should be protected, and then make sure the necessary action is taken over
future years to prevent river salinity levels rising above the target.
This approach, which implies the e¡ective creation of common property
rights, is embodied in the Water Management Bill 2000 in New South
Wales.
5.5 Externalities and prices
Where users appropriated water directly from the river system, it was
typically unpriced. Users supplied by publicly operated irrigation schemes
paid for their water, but water prices rarely covered all operational costs and
included no charge for the capital cost of the scheme or for the value of
water.
Changes to water pricing have resulted primarily from the COAG agree-
ments which require water suppliers to charge full-cost prices and eliminate
cross-subsidies. In general, the `full-cost' price has not included any
allowance for the opportunity cost of water or for externalities such as
salinity (the resource abstraction charge imposed in the Australian Capital
Territory is an exception). However, political acceptance of prices covering
the full cost of irrigation works may be regarded as re£ecting a compromise
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favouring a higher price incorporating Pigovian taxes on externalities.
Nevertheless, the full implementation of a system of tradable water rights
will require the development of pricing systems that are consistent across state
boundaries and that take appropriate account of externalities. This point is
illustrated by the Pilot Interstate Water Trading Project which has required
the formulation of appropriate exchange rates between upstream and
downstream water use, taking account of the increased negative externalities
arising when water use is transferred upstream. In the Pilot Project, the
exchange rate between South Australia and the upstream states is 0.9. That is,
rights to use 10ML of water in South Australia may be traded for rights
to use 9ML in Victoria or New South Wales (Murray^Darling Basin
Commission 2000d). The e¡ect is the same as that of a Pigovian tax.
5.6 The path ahead
Economic considerations played a very limited role in policy-making during
the expansionary phase of the water economy in the Murray^Darling Basin.
As the expansionary phase drew to a close and the problems of the mature
water economy became evident, the need for appropriate economic insti-
tutions became apparent. Indeed, there was some tendency to suggest that
the resolution of the problems was a simple matter of getting prices right (or,
from a Coasian perspective, creating clearly de¢ned property rights).
The experience of the last decade has shown that appropriate economic
institutions are essential, but that the complexity of the problem is such
that no simple policy solution is likely to prove adequate. Concern about
degradation of land, water and natural environments, particularly in relation
to the Murray^Darling Basin, is becoming steadily more widespread. The
environmental movement, in particular, is shifting its attention from the
forest preservation issues that de¢ned the environmental battles of the 1970s
and 1980s to broader issues. Government responses to evidence of rural
and regional disa¡ection with microeconomic reform have included a search
for `nation-building' responses to problems such as land degradation.
In these circumstances, the development of more sophisticated systems of
pricing, regulation and property rights (private and common) is needed
merely to keep pace with the growth of competing demands for control over
land and water resources. The acceptance of sustainability criteria in the long
run will require a reduction in total diversions of water and a return to a £ow
regime more similar to that which would occur naturally. Hence, signi¢cant
improvements in the technical and allocative e¤ciency of water use will be
needed simply to maintain current levels of irrigation-related agricultural
output.
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The convergence of agricultural economics, resource economics and environ-
mental economics has been a notable development of the past twenty years,
re£ected in institutional changes such as the replacement of the Australian
Journal of Agricultural Economics by the Australian Journal of Agricultural
and Resource Economics.
The problems associated with irrigated agriculture in the Murray^Darling
Basin involve complex interactions between agriculture, resources and the
environment. The economic literature on the Murray^Darling Basin there-
fore provides an ideal illustration of the extent to which economic reasoning
derived from a range of di¡erent perspectives can contribute to an under-
standing of environmental problems and to the development of appropriate
policy responses.
Economists have long debated the relative merits of approaches based on
externality, property rights and sustainability concepts. In understanding the
complex problems of the Murray^Darling Basin, an eclectic approach
drawing on all of these perspectives seems most appropriate.
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